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The Russian secret police apparatus has been shrouded in anonymity since birth. Long

the stuff of legend, agents and operations have attracted the attention of both academic and
popular readers of history. From Ivan the Terrible’s ruthless Oprichniki to the current Federal
Security Service (FSB), the organization has undergone significant changes that mirror the
discontinuity of the rulers themselves. Charged to protect the political status quo and fight
subversion, the secret police have been referred to by various names which further the confusion
surrounding their activities – Okhrana, Fontanka, The Special Section, The Cheka, The People's
Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD), The Ministry for State Security, (MGB), and
countless others, including the well-known Committee for State Security, or KGB. The collapse
of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and subsequent opening of clandestine records have furthered this
curiosity and amplified historical scholarship on the subject.
Specifically, the Late Imperial secret police have received special attention in light of the
1905 and 1917 revolutions that rocked the country. Richard Deacon and Ronald Hingley
broadly narrate the entirety of Russian secret police activity from 1565 founding to the early
1970’s and give attention to late twentieth century developments.1 More recently, Frederic S.
Zuckerman narrows the field in The Tsarist Secret Police in Russian Society, 1880-1917 (1996)
and places the organization within a wider European framework of nations struggling to hold
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Hingley’s The Russian Secret Police (1970) takes a wide-angle approach to the security apparatus, beginning with
Ivan the Terrible in 1565 and ending in 1970—fitting, considering the book’s publication date and highpoint of
KGB operations. He focuses on the operations of the secret police and argues that those actions directly influenced
Russian society. More to the point, he contends that they were one of the most dominant forces that shaped the
nation, an argument supported by this current essay.
Deacon similarly chronicles the Russian secret police in A History of the Russian Secret Service (1972),
although his methodology varies. Instead of an administrative approach he frames the narrative around the primary
actors and their major influences. Perhaps the largest difference is his incorporation of foreign infiltration, a topic
that both Hingley and I omit.
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onto their autocratic past.2 Similarly, Jonathan Daly chronicles the creation and progression of
the police administration in Autocracy Under Siege: Security Police and Opposition in Russia
1866-1905 (1998), and its equally thorough sequel, The Watchful State: 1905-1917 (2004).3
Anna Geifman has also done extensive research on the topic, including a provocative biography4
that redefines Russia’s most notorious informant, though most of her works focus on the
terrorists rather than the secret police.5 These scholars and a host of others have addressed the
primary component of the police apparatus – the secret or “double” agent – but leave in their
wake some questions worth positing. How was provocation, whereby undercover police agents
helped to plot and carry out revolutionary activities to only turn in their revolutionary brethren
later, used to fight terrorism? What motivated these provocateurs and the superiors who
controlled them? And most importantly, was this tactic successful?
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Zuckerman finds that Late Imperial Russia was compelled to create such a security police force in order to deal
with a citizen backlash fueled by the Great Reforms and a growing hatred for the Tsar’s culture. He is concerned
chiefly with what constitutes a political crime and how political repression in Europe influenced Russia’s response
to the same threat. This essay relies heavily on his analysis of the lives of undercover agents and their superiors, but
avoids his wider focus.
3
These two works combine to form the preeminent English modern study on the secret police apparatus in Late
Imperial Russia. In Autocracy Under Siege (1998) Daly examines how the security police adapted to changes in the
political and social arena of a monarchy in turmoil. He concludes that while the secret police managed to thwart
various revolutionary plots, the administrative power that was required to do so alienated much of the society at
large, and thus increased those dedicated to the Tsar’s demise. I concur with Daly on this point; however, the
current essay focuses more on internal damage done by traitorous agents rather than society at large.
The Watchful State (2004) picks up after the near collapse of the 1905 Revolution and chronicles the
overhaul of the security police. Attempting to learn from their mistakes, Daly argues that the apparatus developed
into an efficient, effective force that successfully battled terrorism. The blame for their ultimate failure, seen in the
Revolution of 1917, rests on the ineptitude and corruption of upper level officials rather than the agents. On this last
notion Daly and I depart. I find an inherent naivety in the amount of power given to both agents and the officials
who controlled them, and hold both responsible for the fallout.
4
Using updated material from the archives of the Russian Federation (GARF), Geifman paints a less menacing but
equally gutless portrait of Evno Azef in Entangled in Terror: The Azef Affair and the Russian Revolution (2000).
Neither traitor nor master spy, Azef was simply an insecure, greedy informant. While interesting, this notion
reverses decades of research and is therefore used in conjunction with previous scholarship on Azef to provide a
more comprehensive picture.
5
Thou Shalt Kill: Revolutionary Terrorism in Russia, 1894-1917 (1993) is her landmark work and argues that the
17,000 plus killed by revolutionaries influenced the 1905 and 1917 revolutions. In a different vain, Death Orders:
The Vanguard of Modern Terrorism in Revolutionary Russia (2010) positions Russian terrorism in modernity, no
doubt influenced by events in the US and Middle East. Geifman finds that Late Imperial terrorists were part of a
global, transcultural phenomena reaching to today, a growing topic not addressed in this essay.
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Early 20th century author A.T. Vassilyev once stated that, “the gravest reproach made

against the Okhrana is that it employed the objectionable means of provocation – i.e., direct
incitement – first to drive countless numbers into political crime, and thereafter to send them to
Siberia or even bring them to the gallows.”6 While Vassilyev’s criticism of the injustices of
provocation are notable, they are incomplete; the gravest reproach of provocation is not that it
was unethical or immoral (though it could be argued so), but that it was counterproductive to the
fight against political subversion. The essay to follow examines the actions, motivations, and
eventual fallout of secret agents and police officials who practiced provocation. In it I will argue
that agent provocateurs were inherently dangerous yet irresistible to a fledgling administration
who had run out of options to combat terrorism. In an ironic and fateful twist, police superiors
trusted those they shouldn’t have and foolishly believed they could control a country in turmoil.
These mistakes would do irreparable harm to the fight against subversion and lend a hand in
bringing down the Tsar.
The modern relevance of provocation should not be understated. Though rooted in
France and made famous in Russia authorities across the globe continue the practice today.7 In
the United States specifically, The Federal Bureau of Investigation for decades has placed agents
inside criminal and radical groups such as the Ku Klux Klan and Black Panthers.8 More
publicly, the New York Police Department used agent provocateurs to infiltrate protest groups
during the Republican National Convention of 2004.9 In this case, the NYPD’s “R.N.C.
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Richard Deacon, A History of the Russian Secret Service (New York: Taplinger Publishing Company, 1972), 101.
For a thorough, wide-reaching collection of essays on the topic see Patterns of Provocation: Police and Public
Disorder (2000) edited by Richard Bessel and Clive Bessel.
8
Paul Chevigny’s Cops and Rebels: A Study of Provocation (1972) which focuses on a Blank Panther cell in New
York City is a prime example.
9
Dwyer, Jim. "New York Police Covertly Join In at Protest Rallies." The New York Times, December 22, 2005,
Online edition, sec. N.Y. / Region.
http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F60F14F83F540C718EDDAB0994DD404482 (accessed April 12,
2012).
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Intelligence Squad” went as far as to send agents abroad (Canada and Europe) to spy on potential
protest groups.10 At the Democratic National Convention four years later, undercover Denver
Police detectives were pepper-sprayed by their own while staging a fight to escape a heated
crowd. Ironically, their actions may have increased the level of tension among the protestors, a
fact that prompted the American Civil Liberties Union to issue a call for further investigation.11
Though this essay is not concerned with modern police tactics, it is quite fitting that many of
their historical counterparts bare similar qualities. Therefore, an understanding of provocation in
Late Imperial Russia, a nation that saw the stunning success and brutal failure of the policy, is
indispensable.
The Russian “secret collaborator”, or sotrudniki, as I will refer to herein, is a concept
older than the country itself. The Russian proverb “scratch the Russian and you will find the
Tartar” holds true in the practice of espionage, for it was Genghis Kahn who first used the
practice of informers to seek out his enemy’s weakness when sweeping west across Asia.
Mongol soldiers posing as defectors went to outlying villages and gave false information about
the invading army to the inhabitants as they surveyed the terrain. After a few weeks’ time they
returned to their army camps with detailed geographical knowledge and an invasion soon
followed. It was from these origins that the Russian secret police learned the skill of
infiltration.12
It is doubtful, though, that the Genghis Kahn could envision an empire in such
tumultuous state as Russia in 1904. Revolution, long in the hearts of the people and now on their
tongues, was close at hand. Centuries of repression had led liberals, radicals, proletariat, and
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10

Dwyer, Jim. "City Police Spied Broadly Before G.O.P. Convention." The New York Times, March 25, 2007, sec.
N.Y. / Region.
11
Cardona, Felisa. "ACLU wants probe into police-staged DNC protest." The Denver Post , November 7, 2008, sec.
Denver and the West. http://www.denverpost.com/breakingnews/ci_10920817 (accessed April 13, 2012).
12
Richard Deacon, A History of the Russian Secret Service (New York: Taplinger Publishing Company, 1972), 6.

!

62

peasants to clamor in unison for broader civil liberties and changes in the political, social, and
economic structure. The militant tone, exacerbated by strikes, was heading towards an armed
uprising against the tsarist regime.13 Political assassinations had become standard procedure, and
although the security police made mass arrests and shut down illegal presses they were unable to
strike at the heart of the revolutionary ranks. In order to successfully combat their enemy the
tsarist police needed to infiltrate their ranks and gain access to the inner workings of the
organizations.14
The sotrudniki fell into two categories: those who acted as informers on the fringes of
groups and never participated directly in revolutionary activities (osvedeomiteli) and those who
put their lives in harm’s way by penetrating hardcore revolutionary groups. While our focus will
be the latter, the former were important as well. Placed in prison cells, universities, salons, and
even the bureaucracy, the osvedeomiteli collected data and gave detailed reports on their specific
area.15 But it is the agent provocateur that is the focus of this discussion, and among the them
there are four that clearly display the counterproductive nature of provocation: Dmitry Borgrov,
Evno Azef, M. Ia. Tsikhotskaia, and A. A. Petrov. Additionally, Father Gapon and Roman
Malinovskii will be addressed in conjunction with the superiors that controlled them - P.I.
Ratchkovsky and S.P. Beletskii respectively.
Dmitry Borgrov, or agent “Alensky” as he was known to the Secret Police, provides a
straightforward explanation of the devastating nature of the sotrudniki. An ardent reader of
revolutionaries Michael Bakunin and Peter Kropotkin, Borgrov aligned himself during his
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Abraham Ascher, The Revolution of 1905: A Short Version (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), 94.
Fredrik S. Zuckerman, The Tsarist Secret Police in Russian Society, 1880-1917 (New York: New York University
Press, 1997), 39.
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Ibid,. 40.
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studies at the University of Kiev with a covert cell of anarchists.16 He disapproved, however, of
their implementation of anarchism and overtime became disillusioned; soon after in February of
1906 he first offered his services to the Kiev Ochranka and began to inform on his revolutionary
friends.17
The double life of the sotrudniki forced them deep into their roles as enemies of the tsar
and put them in a volatile position of power with little to no accountability. While they might be
monitored early on, it was nearly impossible to keep tabs on them at all time and they were for
the most part left alone by their superiors while undercover.18 Borgrov, rising higher in the ranks
of the anarchists, was given more information (and thus more power), which he often withheld
from the police; other times he reported fully and had his friends arrested.19 This process, called
the “false pose” made the sotrudniki feel as if he was independent of both police and
revolutionaries and able to control the outcome of events. Bogrov, like many secret agents,
became lost in this provocation. By 1909 he was already planning the assassination of former
Prime Minister Stolypin, creating false terrorists and suspects to divert his police superiors.20
Two years later on the night of September 2nd, 1911 Borgrov fatally shot the man during
intermission at the Kiev Opera House. Historian Charles Ruud and Sergei Stepanov dismiss the
idea that Borgrov, a Jew, was retaliating for Stolypin’s apparent anti-Semitic Russian
nationalism; instead, he was a “frightened provocateur who was unable to extricate himself from
his dual roles as police agent and a Socialist Revolutionary terrorist and finally lashed out at his
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Charles A. Rudd, Sergei A. Stepanov, Fontanka 16 (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press),
174.
17
Ibid,. 174.
18
Fredrik S. Zuckerman, The Tsarist Secret Police in Russian Society, 1880-1917 (New York: New York University
Press, 1997), 49.
19
Charles A. Rudd, Sergei A. Stepanov, Fontanka 16 (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press),
176.
20
Ibid.
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main tormentor, the government.”21 There is no evidence to the contrary that proves Borgrov’s
motives were rooted in revenge.22 His life, caught between lines of blurring loyalty, was shared
by many sotrudniki; but retribution would prove a crucial drive for Russia’s most infamous
double agent, Evno Azef, a man who must be mentioned in any discussion on provocation.
Born the son of a poor Jewish tailor in 1869, Azef was a master at adaption and survival,
skills essential to a sotrudniki. At the prompting of his father he obtained an education and
served as a tutor, traveling salesman, reporter, and clerk.23 After meeting some young
revolutionaries in 1892, he was accused of having distributed illegal literature, and, rather than
be arrested, fled to Germany leaving his wife behind.24 While abroad he again crossed paths
with disgruntled Russians activists and the idea came to him: why not turn treason into profit?
Soon after he wrote his famous letter to the Police Department informing them of the actions of
the Karlsruhe Group and a month later he became a salaried member of the Okranka.25
In hindsight it is clear that Azef’s motives were dangerous. By the early 1900’s he was
receiving over five hundred rubles a month, an unheard of sum for a sotrudniki.26 “Azef’s was a
purely mercenary nature,” Police Chief Zubatov would later lament following the unmasking of
his former pupil, “looking at everything from the point of view of profit, working for the
Revolution for the sake of personal gain, and for the Government out of no conviction but also
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Charles A. Rudd, Sergei A. Stepanov, Fontanka 16 (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press),
192.
22
Three agents featured in this paper hail from minority groups; Borgov and Azef were Jewish, and M. Ia.
Tsikhotskaia. was a woman. This certainly begs the question whether the security police specifically targeted
minority groups to be informants, perhaps taking into account their perceived positions in society. The topic is
certainly interesting, and while not be discussed here due to a limitation of sources, it warrants further scholarship
that is hopefully forthcoming.
23
Richard Deacon, A History of the Russian Secret Service (New York: Taplinger Publishing Company, 1972), 103.
24
Ibid.
25
Ibid,. 104.
26
Ibid., 107.

!

65

for the sake of personal profit.”27 But at the time his intelligence on the Socialist Revolutionaries
abroad was so detailed and constant that this was overlooked. Like Borgorv, the nature of the
relationship between Azef and his superiors “allowed disloyal agents to mesmerize their case
officers into a lull of confidence.”28 Several incidents, however, were about to occur that would
cause the police to look with more scrutiny on their provocateur extraordinaire.
From Berlin, Azef made contact with G. A. Gershuni, a chief organizer of revolutionary
activities in Russia who specialized in assassination plots on high-level officials. Following
Azef’s suggestions, however, the security police did not arrest Gershuni when they had the
chance; a few months later Gershuni orchestrated the assassination of Sipyagin, the Interior
Minister.29 Yet still the security police trusted Azef, not aware that his friendship with Gershuni
was keeping him from arresting the man. When Azef did reveal the plot to kill Vyacheslav
Plehve, Sipyagin’s replacement, police superiors had no idea he was concealing a separate
attempt on the life of the Governor of Kharkov, Obolensky.30 Azef, like Borgrov began
withholding vital information while relaying some. In 1903, Azef and Gershuni discussed plans
to kill Bodganovitch, Governor of Ufa, which was carried out several months later. It was only
by his own hands – an accidental telegram sent to a friend – that Gershuni was caught by the
police, leaving Azef in total control of the revolutionaries abroad.31 By sheer cunning and luck
the Russian secret police had one of their own in control of the Battle Organization of the
Socialist Revolutionaries; unfortunately they were completely unaware that their super-agent was
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Ibid.,106.
Fredrik S. Zuckerman, The Tsarist Secret Police in Russian Society, 1880-1917 (New York: New York University
Press, 1997), 47.
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Ibid,. 107.
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Ibid,. 108.
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Ibid,. 110.
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playing both sides for personal gain, which made his unmasking all the more destructive to their
fight against terrorism.
Some historians, notably Richard Deacon, have speculated that Azef had another motive
for carrying out his most notorious act of provocation: revenge. Unlike Borgrov, there is a good
deal of evidence that supports this claim. Deacon argues that the planned assassination of
Interior Minister Phelve was a score settler based on Azef’s Jewish heritage. Following an antiJewish pogrom in Kishenev, Azef was reported by both his revolutionary friends and Zubatov to
have “shook with fury and hate in speaking of Plehve.”32 Clearly Azef blamed Plehve for the
murder of several hundred of his kinsmen, and used his role as a sotrudniki to carry out his plan.
This notion is quite plausible but irrelevant, for Azef’s motive of profit should have been enough
to convince any observer of his unreliability. Instead, desperate to have eyes and ears inside the
enemy camp, the Interior Ministry and the Police Department put their own officials at risk and
in turn got many of them killed. To sum up what Russian historian Jonathan Daly calls
“unwarranted trust”, Police Chief Gerasimov quoted in hindsight, “I had total confidence in
Azef, and gave him freedom of action.”33
Women also entered the ranks of the sotrudniki and their fate differed little from their
male counterparts. M. Ia. Tsikhotskaia, or T. M. Tsetlin as her Socialist Revolutionary friends
knew her, became an informant for the police in 1907. After several years Tsikhotskaia proved
to be a cunning provocateur, infiltrating the combat organization and helping to plot the
assassination of several police officials including Gerasimov (her superior), Kurlov, and other
police officials. Her downfall, though, was not her questionable loyalty as was the case for
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Fredrik S. Zuckerman, The Tsarist Secret Police in Russian Society, 1880-1917 (New York: New York University
Press, 1997), 111.
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Daly, Jonathan. The Watchful State: Security Police and Opposition in Russia, 1906-1917 (DeKalb: Northern
Illinois University Press, 2004), 90.
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Borgrov and Azef. After being unmasked by Vladimir Burstev, the self-appointed revolutionary
detective who denounced Azef, Tsetlin was caught by her revolutionary comrades and sentenced
to death. Rather than face the gallows, she agreed to give up information about the police in
exchange for her life.34 Unlike Borgrov and Azef, Tsetlin did not harbor an ulterior motive;
rather, she valued life more than loyalty and divulged sensitive intelligence that wreaked havoc
on the department. More importantly, Tsetlin’s case brings to light another glaring liability of
provocation: self-preservation. Perhaps more understandable, this motive proved as destructive
as greed and would compromise the operations of other agents.
Desperate for information and apparently willing to stomach the risk, the secret police
continued to put their trust in treacherous men and women; indeed, the immediate aftermath of
the Azef affair is a prime example. Rather than learn from the betrayal of Azef, the police chose
A. A. Petrov as their new undercover agent. A notorious terrorist, Petrov had thrown bombs and
robbed banks for the Socialist-Revolutionaries, but his career was cut short after being turned in
by Tsetlin.35 Predictably, he agreed to inform on his counterparts rather than go to prison, and
his escape was facilitated by the police soon after. On the surface it appears that he, like Tsetlin,
valued life above loyalty; but Petrov’s treachery was of a more dangerous, ideological strand.
Rather than fleeing the country to reassert himself into the Socialist-Revolutionaries, he instead
confessed to the party leadership and swore to redeem his cowardice by killing Gerasimov.36 On
17 December 1909 Security Chief Karpov, Petrov’s naïve handler, paid his double agent a visit
in a St. Petersburg apartment. Suspicious of the unannounced guest, Petrov detonated a bomb
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Daly, Jonathan. The Watchful State: Security Police and Opposition in Russia, 1906-1917 (DeKalb: Northern
Illinois University Press, 2004), 99.
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Ibid,.105.
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Ibid., 106.
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hidden under the kitchen table, which blew Karpov to pieces.37 But what makes this case so
damning is that upon his arrest, Petrov confessed that his covert goal had always been to inflict
damage upon the security police.38 Driven by a conviction that trumped personal safety, he was
the prototype of everything the secret police were trying to stop. So frantic were they to destroy
the revolutionaries that police chiefs like Karpov put their trust where it did not belong, and like
Borgrov, Azef, and Tstetlin, A.A. Petrov made them pay.
The examples above clearly illustrate the volatile nature of the double agent and the use
of provocation as a tactic to fight political subversion. Whether lost in the “false pose”, desiring
money, control, revenge, eager to save one’s neck or defeat an ideological enemy, the sotrudniki
were given an unwarranted trust by the security police administration that proved fatal. But what
about the superiors who chose to employ such tactics? If anything, the incidents above (A. A.
Petrov most of all) bring to light the issue of accountability. Why did the secret police resort to
provocation? How did their own motivations dictate the actions of the sotrudniki who carried
them out?
Provocation was at one time strictly forbidden by Russian authorities, though eventually
the practice was encouraged and funded by the security police in the early 1900’s. When laying
out the foundational principals for political police training, General A.I. Spiridovich was quite
clear on the topic:
It must be explained to him [the double agent], that the means he employs, no
matter how tempting the result…are impermissible once they run contrary to
law. With his initiation into criminal activities or incitement to them, that is,
‘provocation’, the undercover agent not only ceases to be of assistance to the
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government in the struggle against the revolutionaries but becomes a State
Criminal himself.39
But even Spridovich could not deny the success of undercover agents used during the 1880’s to

bring down revolutionary groups. While privately he admitted that the philosophy of provocation
was fundamentally wrong, he acknowledged that the sotrudniki who often employed it were
vital.40 Those who followed him, however, were not nearly as bashful in their acceptance of this
tactic, and their fate will consume the remainder of this essay.
P.I. Ratchkovsky, Chief of the Okranka during the 1880’s, was the developer, if not the
author, of agent provocateur schemes employed during the early 1900’s in Russia. During this
earlier period his techniques had successfully penetrated and rendered useless The People’s
Will41, and in 1905 he was called upon again to uproot terrorism.42 Though successful in the
past, his role in this era reveals an insidious, political motivation that resulted in the murder of an
agent he personally recruited. Donned “Ratchkovsky the Manipulator” by historian Richard
Deacon, the Security Chief was notorious for radical procedures that others wouldn’t consider.43
For example, he encouraged bomb throwing (and even funded it himself), yet made sure the
blame fell on the Socialist-Revolutionaries in hopes of turning public opinion against them.44
His most notorious exploitation was of Father Gapon, a misguided priest who led the peaceful
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march that culminated in Bloody Sunday45. Previously in the service of Police Chief Zubatov in
1903 as a labor organizer, Gapon had become a pitiable figure in the revolutionary movement.46
Ratchkovsky, a shrewd psychologist, knew exactly what to say to arouse the man’s passions. He
flattered Gapon, inflated his pride, and even offered him his job as Security Chief if he would
inform on the revolutionaries.47 Gapon eventually agreed and divulged a contact named
Rutenberg in hopes of regaining his preeminence. Rutenberg, a hardened revolutionary,
immediately smelled Gapon’s treachery and lured the man to a secluded villa outside St.
Petersberg where he hung him from the rafters.48 In contrast to the previous cases, the
manipulation here was done by the superior who knowingly put his agent in harm’s way,
revealing another dark side of provocation.
If a discussion on the sotrudniki must include Evno Azef, then any examination of the
police superiors must equally feature Sergei Zubatov. By no accident are the two names
intertwined, for it was Zubatov who groomed Azef and received credit for the victories (and
crushing defeats) the agent extraordinaire achieved. Like Azef, Zubatov dabbled in
revolutionary activities in his younger days before becoming an informant with the Okhranka in
1884.49 In many ways he saw Azef as a younger version of himself, but the loyalty of his
protégé could not have been more drastic. Zubatov, for example, was an avid reader of Dmitry
Pisarev, a radical who believed that education and cultural development would lead to social
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improvement; conversely, Azef had more base motivations. Only the agent’s unmasking and
subsequent investigation would truly show how blind Zubatov had been.50
Zubatov often used double agents to penetrate revolutionary groups, but he is best known
for inventing a more subtle form of provocation known as Police Socialism, or Zubatovshchina
(Zubatovism). Though innovative, this creation highlights an illusion of control that many in the
secret police administration fell prey to. Perhaps rooted in his studies of Pisarev, Zubatov
wanted to address the worker’s economic needs to assuage them from violent agitation.51 To this
end he launched the Moscow Production Worker’s Aid Society in 1901, a police-controlled trade
union that championed better wages and shorter workdays.52 Police Socialism appeared
successful and even had the blessing of Moscow’s Governor and D. F. Trepov, the chief of
police. By making concessions to the workers Zubatov was killing two birds with one stone; for
if the proletariat had their needs met they would not be drawn into revolutionary ranks, which in
turn would shrink.53
As Zubatovism spread to southern Russia, its architect was promoted to head of the
Special Section, the nerve center for all political investigation in the Russian Empire.54 On the
surface all seemed well, but at the core level a storm was brewing. Police Socialism relied
primarily on the ability to observe and direct the whims of the trade unions, a task easily
accomplished early on. But in 1903 a strike in Odessa spilled out of control; Zubatov’s
representative in the city, Dr. Shayevich, failed to regulate the movement and factories across
southern Russia were shut down.55 Once the Empire’s leading security official, Zubatov was
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discredited and fell under suspicion of “crypto-revolutionary exploiting police techniques to
further the cause of subversion.”56 In short, the Zubatovism experiment had failed.
Zubatov was no traitor, but his use of provocation (in this liberal sense) was misguided.
Believing that he could channel the worker’s unrest to police-monitored trade unions may have
been admirable, but ultimately fatal. Rather than transform the agitation into economic
progression he transferred it to a new venue, arguably creating an additional enemy of the
government and a host of subversives for the security police to monitor. A desire for control
and the belief that it was actually attainable had proven to be a disastrous mirage, but Zubatov
would not be the last or most infamous to be fooled by such a delusion.
S.P. Beletskii, appointed the Director of Police in 1912, did not learn from his
predecessor’s mistake. Like Zubatov, Beletskii believed that pro-government trade unions
controlled by the police were a workable alternative to channel revolutionary aggression away
from terrorism. But his strategies were far more radical; after assuming power he aimed to
penetrate and control not only the union movement but the Duma57 and radical press as well.58
Following the treacherous assassination of Stolypin by Borgrov, widespread reform altered many
policies and strategies of the Special Section and Secret Police. Beletskii, however, increased
rather than eradicated the number of sotrudniki, ordering more agents than ever before to be
placed among the revolutionaries, specifically the Bolsheviks.59 To employ this stratagem he
chose the well-known Leninist Roman Malinovskii who was already steeped in revolutionary
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rhetoric. (In an interesting note, Beletskii even went as far as to write the speeches his agent
would read in the Duma).60 This approach of containment was rooted in a belief that by
controlling the grass roots organizations and placing spies at all levels one could dictate the
actions of the revolutionaries. Beletskii high-risk high-reward-tactics, however, were about to
explode in his face.
The fiery orations delivered by Malinovskii in the Duma rallied the labor movements to
massive unrest, ironically achieving their overt objective. By the summer of 1913 it was clear
that Beletskii strategy had failed; by infiltrating the Bolsheviks more than ever before the
sotrudniki had been too good of actors and incited their countrymen to labor strikes on a scale
unseen in Russia.61 Naturally, the police department officially terminated the policy of
containment, and returned to mass arrests and liquidation of revolutionary groups.62 In short,
Beletskii’s plans had gone the way of Zubatov’s, his schemes having “evolved beyond his
comprehension and his control.”63
Why, then, did the security police engage in provocation at all? If loyalty and control
were always in question, why not pursue other means of counterinsurgency? The answer lies in
the success of numerous double agents. In the decades prior to the revolution of 1905, The
People’s Will had been devastated by Sergei Degaev, a spy for the St. Petersburg Okhrana.
Likewise, S. K. Belov, a double agent buried deep within the Moscow cell of the Black
Repartition was instrumental in bringing down that terrorist group in 1884.64 The early 1900’s
also had a handful of strikingly successful sotrudniki, including Zinaida Zhuchenko, Aleksandr
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Mass, and Lakov Zhitomirskii whose actions did not compromise the state’s fight against
terrorism.65 One double agent in particular—Anna Egoronv Serebreiakove—shows why the
security police continually used provocation. Through her work with the Red Cross,
Serebreiakove managed to weave her way into the Socialist-Revolutionaries. Her home became
a meeting place for various revolutionaries that passed through the city, meetings she
eavesdropped on and reported to the Moscow police.66 She was never unmasked and enjoyed a
long, successful career as an informant; but her experience was not the norm, primarily because
her involvement in provocation was minimal. Though Serebreiakove was able to report on the
many revolutionary groups that met in her home, she was not a pivotal member who directed
policy or drummed up regicide. Rather, she was merely a listener who had spectacular luck. Her
acts of provocation in this sense were minimal, thus allowing her remarkable success. To many
police administrators, though, Serebreiakove was worth the risk, even if she turned out to be an
Azef.
Zubatov once told his junior political police officers that they “must look at the sotrudniki
as a beautiful woman with whom you are maintaining a secret liaison. Be careful with her [as
she] is the apple of your eye. One careless step and you disgrace her.”67 While he was referring
to the secrecy that case officers must have with their agents, a striking parallel can be noted from
this eloquent analogy that is vital to the modern understanding of provocation in Late Imperial
Russia. The relationship of the double agent and their supervisors was one reminiscent of a
knowingly immoral but tempting pleasure, one yielding momentary gratification with little to no
thought of future consequences. Widely thought to be unethical, a secret agent in the enemy’s
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camp was extremely seductive to the upper level police administrators. Foiled assassination
plots and mass arrests made possible by the sotrudniki were the forbidden fruit that some
superiors could not resist. Though they can hardly be blamed for being drawn to such endeavors,
the proponents of provocation are nonetheless responsible for the devastating outcomes that their
choices had on the fight against subversion. As most salacious affairs, the participant was often
caught in the present, robbed of foresight to navigate the damage their seductress could inflict on
them, or their actions could inflict on themselves.
Such was the case of the sotrudniki in Late Imperial Russia and the volatile tactic of
provocation. Though often effective in the short term, double agents were fundamentally
dangerous and often sought control, power, money, and revenge. Desperate for information, the
security police knowingly put their faith in these men and women who often became
disillusioned or changed loyalties to suit their own desires. The superiors who enlisted them
suffered a similar fate. A desire to control the avenues of unrest led many police chiefs to
increase provocation to levels unseen in Russia and knowingly put their agents and the stability
of the Empire at risk. Others naively assumed that they could contain the revolutionaries,
directing their steps through provocation. This too proved fatal, and not only deteriorated public
opinion of the security police, but also pushed many to the radical ranks and hastened the coming
revolution.
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